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Abstract
Accountability is of universal interest to the business ethics community, but the emphasis to date has been primarily at the 
level of the industry, organization, or key individuals. This paper unites concepts from relational and felt accountability 
and team dynamics to provide an initial explanatory framework that emphasizes the importance of social interactions to 
team accountability. We develop a measure of team accountability using participants in the USA and Europe and then use 
it to study a cohort of 65 teams of Irish business students over three months as they complete a complex simulation. Our 
hypotheses test the origins of team accountability and its effects on subsequent team performance and attitudinal states. 
Results indicate that initial team accountability is strongly related to team trust, commitment, efficacy, and identifying with 
the team emotionally. In established teams, accountability increases effort and willingness to continue to collaborate but did 
not significantly improve task performance in this investigation.
Keywords Collective · Commitment · Felt accountability · Group · Longitudinal · Measure · Performance · Relational 
accountability · Team · Trust
Introduction
Accountability is prevalent in the ethics literature because it 
makes people attend to the relevant prescriptions for conduct 
and provides a mechanism for the social control of behav-
ior in accord with those prescriptions (Quinn & Schlenker, 
2002). Practitioners and academics alike treat accountability 
as a means of directing and correcting individual and organi-
zational efforts and performance and encouraging socially 
responsible behaviors. Accountability may be thought of as 
the “adhesive that binds social systems together” (Frink & 
Klimoski, 1998, p. 3) and as such is not only a fundamental 
principle of the organizational sciences, but is also a neces-
sity for the effective operation of enterprise (Frink & Kli-
moski, 1998; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
Traditional, formal accountability systems are fading 
in many quarters as authority-based relationships decline 
(Moncrieffe, 2011). The ongoing transformation in the basic 
organization of work has resulted in a less hierarchical struc-
ture and the emergence of teams as the core building blocks 
of organizations (O’Neill & Salas, 2018), which calls for 
an urgent reexamination of the inherent nature of account-
ability. In particular, this change necessitates a better under-
standing shared accountability (Bergsteiner, 2012; de Leede 
et al., 1999), or how ‘we’ hold ourselves accountable.
Our paper joins the shift away from studying accountabil-
ity as an objective external feature of the context, i.e., report-
ing and surveillance systems or obligations to stakeholders, 
and instead develops a view of accountability that is derived 
from relationships and social exchanges and is collectively 
lived and breathed (Frink & Klimoski, 2004; Gefland et al., 
2004; Painter-Morland, 2006). The human core of account-
ability is particularly relevant in times of turmoil such as 
the global health pandemic. An orderly environment can be 
effectively dealt with by formal measures, but professionals 
across the globe report that flourishing in chaos requires the 
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renewed focus on human purpose, fairness, ethics, collabora-
tion, and relationships. In this context, effective teaming has 
become a ‘life raft’ keeping organizations and their talent 
afloat during COVID-19 (Deloitte, 2020, p. 24).
We define team accountability as team members’ shared 
expectations of being held answerable for their common 
actions or decisions (Frink et al., 2008; Kou & Stewart, 
2018; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). These expectations arise 
through an interdependent process of group members 
interpreting formal accountability mechanisms, introduc-
ing felt obligations, shaping routines and communication 
patterns, and nurturing the trust, loyalty, and commitment 
that encourage or curtail member behaviors. Our proposed 
conceptualization of team accountability includes an impor-
tant moral dimension because team members are not only 
accountable to external authorities, but are also accountable 
to and for each other, making them moral actors with an 
obligation to serve the interests of the team (Clark & Brown, 
2015; Robinson, 2015).
Such an approach applies a relational understanding of 
accountability to the team context. This perspective spot-
lights the relational context within which responsibilities 
and duties develop and focuses attention on the dynamic 
network of interactive relationships within which individu-
als and organizations are embedded in the business envi-
ronment (Painter-Morland & Deslandes, 2017). An order 
emerges over time through the interactions of individuals 
who participate in the team. This developing sense of recip-
rocal responsibility, commitment, and shared purpose may 
resist being codified as formal rules and procedures, but it 
shapes the normative backdrop against which the actions and 
decisions of the team play out.
The relational approach to team accountability provides 
support for treating the concept as an emergent team phe-
nomenon. Emergent constructs form over time through a 
synthesis of the interactions of team members (Cronin et al., 
2011; Marks et al., 2001). In the context of teams, emergent 
phenomena ‘bubble up’ from lower-level constituent proper-
ties that exist in the form of individual and dyadic behaviors 
(Waller et al., 2016, p. 565). This means that team account-
ability cannot be examined before the team has been formed 
or has worked together. Team accountability in our view 
exemplifies ‘strong’ emergence as it arrives from lower-level 
parts but it exceeds their sum, continues over time, is sub-
stantial enough to be felt and experienced by team members, 
and can exert downward causal forces that affect individual 
team members and their interactions.
This paper advances the concept of team accountability 
through four approaches. First, we review and integrate ideas 
from relational accountability and team dynamics to provide 
a cross-disciplinary conceptualization of team accountabil-
ity. In this conceptualization, the primary accountability 
actor is the collective rather than the individual, and the 
audience to whom the team is accountable includes its 
members.
Our second contribution is to develop a working measure 
(Team Accountability Questionnaire, TAQ hereafter) that 
addresses limitations in existing accountability measure-
ments (Hall et al., 2017; Kou & Stewart, 2018). This 8-item 
measure was developed using a U.S. business student sample 
(Study 1a) and validated using senior leaders in the U.K. 
(Study 1b) and an online paid subject pool from the U.S. 
(Study 1c).
We then used the measurement tool to follow 65 teams 
of Irish business students for three months as they com-
pleted a complex business development simulation (Study 
2). Based on our results, our third contribution is to establish 
collective team accountability as a coherent emergent state 
and to demonstrate its relationship with team trust, commit-
ment, affective identification, and team efficacy. Our fourth 
contribution addresses practical concerns about collective 
accountability. Presumably getting collective accountabil-
ity ‘right’ matters because it should inhibit social loafing, 
increase performance, and reduce turnover intentions, all 
outcomes that are valued by organizations. We therefore 
examine whether team accountability indeed predicts col-
lective effort, task performance, and willingness to work 
together again (Study 2).
Theoretical Background
An often made point in the ethics literature and observa-
tions of business practices is that even the most carefully 
conceived accountability mechanisms do not always lead to 
accountable behaviors by individuals or organizations (Man-
souri & Rowney, 2014). For instance, individuals occupying 
comparable work environments, with equivalent demands 
and expectations, can perceive increased accountability as 
coercive and oppressive, while others in the same context 
welcome accountability and engage proactively with perfor-
mance targets (Ogden et al., 2006).
Acknowledging this reality, many researchers have advo-
cated a phenomenological view of accountability, which 
argues that accountability is best viewed as a subjective 
interpretation, or a state of mind (i.e., felt accountability), 
rather than an objective state of affairs (Breaux et al., 2009; 
Frink et al., 2008; Gefland et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2017; 
Hochwarter et al., 2005; Hochwarter et al., 2007; Lanivich 
et al., 2010; Wallace et al., 2011). Indeed, subjective inter-
pretations are typically more important than the actual 
external context because these perceptions drive attitudes 
and behavior (Lewin, 1947). A supportive context is neces-
sary but not sufficient for the development of team account-
ability (de Leede et al., 1999). For this reason, we exam-
ine team accountability through collective perceptions of 
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accountability rather than through the existence of formal 
accountability mechanisms.
If team accountability is indeed a subjective interpreta-
tion of objective accountability mechanisms, what prompts 
these interpretations in a team context? We suggest that 
social interactions between group members give rise to a 
collective understanding of what accountability entails for 
the group. To support the criticality of relationships with 
team members in substantiating team accountability, we 
draw on recent work on relational accountability.
Relational View of Team Accountability
Accountability is increasingly being seen through a wider 
lens that includes the social relationships and power dynam-
ics that influence what accountability means in practice 
(Moncrieffe, 2011). A relational understanding of account-
ability proceeds from the assumption that the most mean-
ingful normative duties and responsibilities resist legalistic 
formulation and codification and originates with the prem-
ise that we are primarily social creatures and that social 
relationships shape accountability (Painter-Morland, 2006, 
2007, 2011). Being in a relationship and wanting to main-
tain it—i.e., relational responsiveness—is fundamental to 
the mindset of expecting to give an account. Relational 
approaches to accountability inquire how people experience 
accountability and how the quality of social relationships 
shapes accountability outcomes.
This understanding of accountability highlights the 
dynamic network of interactive relationships within which 
individuals and organizations are embedded (Beu & Buck-
ley, 2001; Gefland et al., 2004; Johansen, 2008; McGrath, 
1991), for it is “only within the context of particular relation-
ships that any kind of account becomes meaningful and sig-
nificant” (Painter-Morland, 2006, p. 93). This does not imply 
permissive subjectivism or relativism. Rather, the dynamic 
expectations that define moral duties and obligations within 
a relational context provide guidance. These expectations 
may be particularly salient at key milestones, such as the 
midpoint of a project (Gersick, 1991). Furthermore, the 
kinds of moral constraints that emerge in the context of spe-
cific relationships may arguably be more demanding than 
conventional accountability mechanisms. For example, the 
degree of peer agreement that an action is wrong decreases 
unethical behaviors far more than the presence of an organi-
zational code of ethics (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Moreo-
ver, formal accountability mechanisms can paradoxically 
interfere with moral responsivity (Beu & Buckley, 2001), 
such as when accountability for outcomes leads to greater 
self-serving behaviors (Pitesa & Thau, 2013) or misalloca-
tion of limited funds (Adelberg & Batson, 1978).
According to the relational understanding of accountabil-
ity, values result from key individuals within a particular 
system interacting with each other. These values represent 
an ‘emergent order’ which is the result of relational dynam-
ics rather than the unilateral imposition of formal account-
ability mechanisms or moral ideals (Painter-Morland, 2006, 
p. 94). Everyday engagements between stakeholders enable 
actors to identify and refine the nature and extent of their 
moral obligations and shape mutual expectations (Painter-
Morland, 2006, 2011). The need to belong is a core human 
motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & Ryan, 2000) and 
individuals are motivated to adjust behavior in order to gain 
or maintain membership in a group that has a high relational 
value (Leary, 2001). Specifically, among collaborators, these 
interactions create a tacit sense of reciprocal responsibility, 
loyalty, and common cause that shapes behaviors in a way 
that may not be formally articulated (Painter-Moreland & 
Deslandes, 2017). Thus, relational accountability not only 
provides a basis for a shared sense of propriety and moral-
ity, but also draws emotional as well as cognitive aspects of 
value (Robinson, 2015) and encourages behavior that forti-
fies continued group membership.
Applying these concepts to team accountability sug-
gests that ongoing meaningful interactions between team 
members give rise to team accountability practices beyond 
any formal accountability mechanisms or individual attrib-
utes (Moncrieffe, 2011). From an ethics perspective, team 
accountability can be viewed as group members interpret-
ing formal policies, introducing felt obligations, shaping 
interaction patterns, and providing the context within which 
team behaviors are supported or curbed. Such internal team 
interactions may be more demanding than external sources 
of accountability in terms of providing meaningful guid-
ance, in part because members themselves contribute to the 
emergence of mutual accountability and to the rewarding or 
sanctioning of team members.
A relational understanding of accountability indicates 
that team accountability is an emergent team phenomenon. 
Emergent constructs are variable and dynamic and form over 
time through a synthesis of the interactions of team members 
(Cronin et al., 2011; Marks et al., 2001). Emergent team phe-
nomena emanate from a series of behaviors of group mem-
bers and include states such as collective cognition or emo-
tions as well as behavioral patterns and power structures. 
Each manifestation of team accountability will be unique 
because the lower-level components interact in a dynamic 
fashion. To use the language of emergence, team account-
ability is ‘radically novel’ (Waller et al., 2016) because 
it can neither be predicted from individual team member 
accountability nor reduced to component parts, and exists at 
a level higher than individual team members (Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000). This implies that studying team accountability 
requires an explicit focus on group dynamics.
A hallmark of an emergent state is its coherence over 
time (Marks et  al., 2001; Waller et  al., 2016). If team 
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accountability ebbs and flows in response to internal and 
external dynamics, we would still expect it to endure as a 
global team property. Coherence and endurance do not nec-
essarily imply that group members’ perceptions of account-
ability converge, but rather that team members are able to 
collectively recognize and experience team accountability in 
a persistent way for a nontrivial time period as they perform 
interdependent organizational tasks. With awareness of team 
accountability comes potential feelings of agency by group 
members concerning their ability or desire to act to change 
accountability patterns. This means team accountability is 
not only the bottom-up product of team member interactions 
over time, but in theory exerts top-down influence on ongo-
ing group member interactions.
Hypotheses Development
At the start we defined team accountability as team mem-
bers’ expectations of being held answerable for their com-
mon actions or decisions. Based on a relational under-
standing of accountability we made the argument that 
expectations of being answerable as a team are in large part 
the product of ongoing group member interactions in which 
formal accountability mechanisms are interpreted and inter-
nalized by the team. While individuals contribute to these 
dynamics, team accountability is a global phenomenon, 
unique and irreducible to individual members.
Co‑emergence of Team Accountability
During the formative stage of team development the continu-
ous social dynamics between group members will naturally 
shape team states in addition to initial accountability expec-
tations. We suggest that in the context of studying primordial 
team states, it is appropriate to examine co-variation rather 
than causation (Costa et al., 2014; Gucciardi et al., 2018). 
Therefore, we first identify the constructs with which team 
accountability ought to co-emerge during its infancy and 
defer making precise causal statements about the conse-
quences of team accountability until enough time has passed 
for a team to accumulate a series of meaningful performance 
episodes.
Within the realm of related team states that encircle nas-
cent team accountability, the most primary must certainly be 
the trust felt within the team. In abstract, accountability and 
trust both refer to behavioral expectations held by parties 
in a relationship and evolve based on interpersonal interac-
tions and group dynamics (Costa et al., 2018). Trust and 
accountability can both be seen as a moral phenomenon that 
occurs in the context of team relationships (Cohen & Dien-
hart, 2013). Trust, however, is distinct from accountability 
because it refers to an actor’s willingness to be vulnerable 
to the actions of another party, irrespective of the ability to 
control that other party (Mayer et al., 1995).
We anticipate that when a team starts to collaborate, 
accountability and trust build on and reinforce another. 
Trust may be ready to be activated on newly formed teams 
due to preexisting conditions such as strong identification 
with the group, imported expectations about roles or skills, 
or anticipating future professional interactions (i.e., ‘swift 
trust’, Kroeger et al., 2021; Meyerson et al., 1996). Trust 
may also develop incrementally through interpersonal inter-
actions (Costa et al., 2018). In both forms, we expect that 
trust should help convert individual actions into coordina-
tion and collaborative team effort (Dirks, 1999; Meyerson 
et al., 1996), thereby positively influencing perceptions of 
accountability shared among team members.
An alternative perspective is that when initial trust is 
high, there is less need to invest in monitoring the relation-
ship (Ammeter et al., 2004). However, we suggest that when 
trust is high, teammates will still feel morally accountable 
to each other and behave cooperatively, independently of 
whether or not they are held formally accountable (De Cre-
mer et al., 2001). This suggests that trust and team account-
ability are not operating along a single continuum (Ehren 
et al., 2019).
Actually being accountable as a team can also ensure 
that trust becomes an established feature of the team (Ehren 
et al., 2019). Initial efforts to establish accountability will 
signal reliability and acceptance of vulnerability to inter-
dependencies as well as emphasize collective well-being. 
Indications of teammates' competence, benevolence, and 
integrity should positively influence evaluations of collec-
tive trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995) which will encour-
age trusting behaviors such as relying on others' skills or 
judgments or delegating tasks to as yet unproven colleagues.
H1a Team accountability is positively related to initial team 
trust.
In addition to showing a positive relationship with trust, 
we anticipate that team accountability will emerge in tandem 
with a sense of oneness as a team (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; 
Zhang et al., 2014). This affective identification with a team 
is associated with feelings of pride and joy (Johnson et al., 
2012), greater belongingness (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dut-
ton et al., 1994), and deeper internalization of and contribu-
tion towards the goals of the workgroup (Mael & Ashforth, 
1992). Even among team members with conflicting goals a 
sense of team identification allows members to share their 
perspectives and work together to maximize team perfor-
mance (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). Thus, higher affec-
tive identification for the team is likely to instill a stronger 
sense of ‘we’ that will boost internalization of accountability 
expectations as team members work together to overcome 
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conflicting goals and engage in collective actions to drive 
performance.
A spirit of unity and togetherness should support the 
emergence of relational accountability within the team. 
When team members connect on a positive emotional level 
and where being a member of the group is valued (Riketta 
& Van Dick, 2005), the salience of maintaining healthy rela-
tionships with other team members will be higher. However, 
fault lines—potential team division into subgroups based on 
the alignment on one or more social categories—can make 
it very difficult for a superordinate team to emerge in the 
presence of stereotyping and in-group favoritism (Bezrukova 
et al., 2009; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Thatcher, 2011). In 
teams with active subgroups and weak team-level attach-
ments, relational accountability should more naturally gravi-
tate around subgroups. Drawing attention to shared account-
abilities could help bridge differences in such situations by 
reinforcing the interdependence of subgroups. Therefore, we 
offer the following hypothesis.
H1b Team accountability is positively related to initial team 
identification.
The third dynamic relevant to understanding team 
accountability during the early stage of team development 
is commitment. Acceptance and belief in the team’s goals 
and a willingness to exert effort on behalf of the team should 
support the growth of team accountability expectations. The 
more determined a group is to do its best, the more likely 
the group is to monitor its performance against their agreed 
upon objectives and expect to explain lapses in performance 
relative to team goals. Commitment has further been shown 
to increase information sharing within teams (Aubé et al., 
2014; Liu & Li, 2018), which should encourage communica-
tion norms of keeping each other informed about task pro-
gress. Beyond facilitating information flow and performance 
tracking, commitment to a higher purpose also stimulates the 
development of positive working relationships and citizen-
ship behaviors to achieve those objectives (Aubé & Rous-
seau, 2005; Bishop et al., 2000; Pearce & Herbik, 2004). 
These reasons lead us to anticipate an initial positive effect 
of commitment on accountability.
The countervailing argument is that team accountability 
expectations are a precursor to commitment. The general 
challenge of accountability is how to get the best out of peo-
ple—how to secure their commitment to desired behaviors 
(Bergsteiner, 2012). Expecting to be held answerable to a 
relevant audience is supposed to increase a team’s persis-
tence and effort in the desired direction. Under this premise, 
shared accountability expectations will motivate teams to 
allocate their efforts and resources in ways that allow them 
to address expectations (Katzenbach & Smith, 1993). For 
example, when a group is held collectively accountable for 
making quality decisions, members focus their energy on 
exchanging more information and achieving shared out-
comes (Liu & McLeod, 2014; Scholten et al., 2007). Given 
the support for mutual causality, we predict a positive rela-
tionship between accountability and commitment at the 
launch of a team.
H1c Team accountability is positively related to initial team 
commitment.
Team efficacy is the fourth state we suggest will emerge 
along with team accountability. When a team believes that 
it has sufficient ability to complete its assigned tasks and to 
do them well it is more likely to anticipate accounting for 
achievements rather than failures (Gully et al., 2002; Zac-
arro et al., 1995), which would lead to embracing shared 
responsibilities. Evidence from the military demonstrates 
that a team’s belief in its ability to solve problems and make 
good decisions improves social cohesion (Hirshfield and 
Benerth, 2008) which should facilitate the relational con-
nections needed for team accountability to emerge.
In the early stages of team development, accountability 
should increase a team’s belief in its ability to do the work 
it has taken on. Team accountability contributes to percep-
tions of team efficacy through its effects on coordination and 
cooperation. Expecting to account as a group and to each 
other involves taking responsibility for decisions, monitor-
ing progress, explaining choices, and being able to count 
on members to meet their commitments. These patterns of 
behavior are likely to strengthen the team’s beliefs in its 
capabilities (Watson et al., 2001).
H1d Team accountability is positively related to initial team 
efficacy.
We suggest that by the halfway point between the begin-
ning and final team deadline, team accountability should be 
tangible enough to predict subsequent outcomes of interest 
to organizations. Team members should have established a 
communal history, social and task interaction patterns are 
better established, and there should be fewer unknowns and 
more givens (McGrath, 1991). The basic configuration into 
which the team's members are organized and maintenance 
activities are executed should be assembled (Gersick, 1988, 
1991) and having to account for team efforts will be more 
salient at the midpoint than at the start, as will the potential 
for rewards and penalties. Awareness of time becomes acute 
at the midpoint and fear of running out of time can create a 
‘jolt of urgency’ (Gersick, 1991, p. 27). This heightens per-
formance pressures and raises concerns about group image. 
Characteristic responses include checking external require-
ments, seeking outside assistance, making temporal com-
mitments, and regulating the flow of task and interpersonal 
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interactions (Chang et al., 2006; Gersick, 1988), each of 
which highlights the salience of collective accountability. 
We therefore anticipate that by the midpoint of most collabo-
rative projects, a team will have interacted sufficiently for a 
sense of collective accountability to mature from a generic 
meaning into one that is uniquely situated within that par-
ticular team and organizational context (McGrath, 1991).
Consequences of Team Accountability
Understanding the relationship between team account-
ability and team performance is critical because organiza-
tional teams are formed to deliver on stakeholder objectives 
(O’Neill & Salas, 2018). Productivity includes the behav-
iors employed in reaching targets (Klimoski & Moham-
med, 1994) as well as the growth potential of the team (Bell 
& Marentette, 2011; Hackman, 1987). Without viability, 
members will eventually burn out even if a team is produc-
tive. The following section therefore proposes relationships 
between team accountability and task performance and 
effort, as well as the long-term sustainability of the team.
The positive effects of accountability mechanisms on 
team performance have been explored primarily in experi-
mental contexts with nominal teams subjected to various 
accountability conditions. Accountability has often been 
investigated as a potential antidote to process loss in group 
decision-making. For example, when teams are told they 
will be held accountable for how they make decisions, they 
exchange more information (Liu & McLeod, 2014) and more 
often choose the correct alternative (Scholten et al., 2007). 
Group members expecting to be collectively responsible 
display less groupthink than control groups. In particu-
lar, accountability staves off excessive consensus-seeking, 
results in a better power balance within the group, and 
produces less risky decisions (Kroon et al., 1991). Outside 
the laboratory environment, Wallace and colleagues report 
better sales and customer service in restaurants with higher 
shared accountability in management staff, so long as they 
also felt empowered (Wallace et al., 2011). The relational 
nature of team accountability should focus the team on 
achieving collective goals for reasons in addition to—or in 
spite of—formal accountability systems. Thus, we predict a 
positive relationship between accountability and team task 
performance.
H2 Midpoint team accountability predicts higher endpoint 
performance.
Performance measures contain variance attributable to 
factors other than teamwork such as availability of resources 
or industry shocks and are usually not diagnostic because 
they may not indicate potential underlying causes (Can-
non-Bowers & Salas, 1997). Process measures address 
the strategies and behaviors deployed to reaching desired 
outcomes. Team process-based performance may include, 
among others, levels of collective effort expended or the 
quality of interpersonal relationships (Klimoski & Moham-
med, 1994). We anticipate that feelings of being morally 
obligated to another should create a shared motivational 
reality which influences the direction, intensity, and persis-
tence of team behavior over time (Park et al., 2013). Team 
accountability should therefore both increase goal-directed 
effort and reduce social loafing, free-riding and other ten-
dencies to reduce efforts or escape responsibilities (Karau & 
Williams, 1993; Latané et al., 1979). We therefore suggest:
H3 Midpoint accountability predicts greater endpoint effort.
The sustainability and growth potential of a team—i.e., 
team viability—is an essential measure of effectiveness for 
groups that have longer lifecycles (Bell & Marentette, 2011; 
Hackman, 1987). Teams with a stronger sense of shared 
accountability should be better positioned to stay together in 
the long run than those with weak feelings of mutual obliga-
tion because they have developed work processes and com-
munication norms that facilitate successful performance. 
Healthy team accountability behaviors should discourage 
burnout and divisive behaviors because members feel an 
obligation to help others and provide social and instrumen-
tal support. The nature of feeling accountable to each other 
further solidifies the sense of belonging to the group, which 
facilitates in-group bias and the desire to maintain member-
ship in the group (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Indeed, anteced-
ents of team viability include denser emotional connections 
within the team and greater social integration (Balkundi & 
Harrison, 2006; Foo et al., 2006). This leads us to expect the 
following relationship:
H4 Midpoint team accountability predicts stronger viability.
In addition to impacting performance outcomes, we 
expect that accountability will positively influence rela-
tionship dynamics. We assume that when a team starts col-
laborating, accountability emerges hand in hand with other 
team dynamics which muddies causal effects. To identify 
the unique impact of accountability requires space for an 
accountability mindset to develop. Once an accountability 
mindset develops, it should be predictive of greater team 
trust and deeper commitment to the shared cause. These two 
attitudes are foundational to the functioning of the team and 
relevant throughout the life of the team:
H5a Midpoint team accountability predicts greater endpoint 
trust.
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H5b Midpoint team accountability predicts greater endpoint 
commitment.
Methodology
In order to test these hypotheses we first needed to address 
measurement issues. In their review of felt accountability in 
organizations, Hall and colleagues identified the lack of a 
validated instrument that captures answerability to audiences 
other than top management and the reliance on experimental 
conditions that may not capture the relational, dynamic, and 
perceptual nature of accountability as two main issues limit-
ing accountability research (2017).
Study 1a: Scale Development
Our research process therefore started by developing 
and validating a team accountability questionnaire that 
could work across organizational levels. In a conceptually 
valid measure of shared team accountability the primary 
accountability actor is the group (not the individual), the 
audience to whom the team is accountable includes its 
members, and the content assesses collective expectations 
about explaining and justifying team decision processes 
and performance, as well as team dynamics related to 
relational accountabilities. We followed deductive scale 
development processes to generate an initial set of items 
(Hinkin, 1998) because our definition of team accountabil-
ity builds on the classic definition of accountability which 
focuses on the expectation of answering for behaviors and 
outcomes to a relevant audience (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; 
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
Item Generation
A search of the accountability literature identified 120 indi-
vidual accountability items that could be shifted to the level 
of the team by changing the referent from ‘I’ to ‘we’ and by 
changing the content to reflect shared expectations (Chan, 
1998). We whittled down this list to 22 items by prioritizing 
three scales developed with input from managerial samples 
(Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Mero et al., 2014; Ogden et al., 
2006), a scale that has been used widely in the felt account-
ability domain (Hochwarter et al., 2005), and several checks 
of experimental manipulations of accountability (e.g., Pitesa 
& Thau, 2013). Through discussions with an expert on teams 
on content validity, we realized that our initial pool of items 
drawn from the individual accountability literature might not 
fully capture the ongoing team member interactions we had 
theorized were essential to formal accountability demands 
being interpreted and internalized. For that reason we wrote 
five additional items specific to team processes that would 
reinforce perceptions of being accountable to each other.
Measures
We also collected measures of team trust, identification, 
commitment, and viability so that we could examine the 
reliability of these measures prior to relying on them to 
test our hypotheses. Affective identification (Johnson 
et al., 2012) was measured with three items. Intragroup 
trust (Simons & Peterson, 2000) was measured with four 
items. Team commitment (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999) and 
viability (Marrone et al., 2007) were measured with five 
items each.
Sample
Eighteen teams of undergraduate business students enrolled 
in a required management course at a U.S. university pilot 
tested our accountability items. The students had been 
working together in randomly assigned teams of four or five 
members over the term to develop a video. The total sam-
ple size was 70 individual participants (45 percent women). 
Participants responded to an electronic survey link. Items 
were assessed by participants indicating the extent to which 
they agreed or disagreed with a given statement where 
1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.
Analyses
SPSS was used to evaluate the most suitable items from our 
list of 27 possible candidates. Redundant items and those 
that exhibited low inter-item correlations were discarded. 
We screened out accountability items that correlated too 
highly or not enough with team trust, identification, com-
mitment, and viability. Corrected item-scale correlations 
were inspected and several more cuts were made to ensure 
retained team accountability items were representative of 
the whole theoretical domain. The eight selected items of 
the Team Accountability Questionnaire (TAQ) indicate a 
coefficient alpha (α) of 0.90. Item means and correlations 
with theoretically related scales are reported in Table 1. The 
provenance of each piloted item is provided in the Appendix.
We then used exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to exam-
ine the convergent and discriminant validity of the TAQ. 
Large samples are always beneficial; however, when factors 
are well defined or their number is limited, small sample size 
EFA can yield reliable solutions (de Winter et al., 2009). 
We specified a two-factor solution with oblique rotation 
and examined accountability and trust, accountability and 
commitment, accountability and identification, and account-
ability and viability.
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Results
The accountability items loaded on their intended factor. 
Factor loadings for the accountability items ranged from 
0.33 to 0.94 with an average of 0.65 across the EFAs. In all 
analyses there are 7 or more strongly loading team account-
ability items (0.50 or higher) which indicates a solid factor 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005).
Study 1b: Scale Validation
To examine the internal structure of the TAQ and ensure 
it is appropriate for use in more traditional work settings 
and with mature professionals, the lead author distributed 
an electronic survey to all the senior leaders of a large mul-
tinational pharmaceutical company headquartered in the 
United Kingdom. This site was selected because its senior 
leadership had chosen accountability as one of their core 
leadership themes and were tracking efforts to integrate 
shared accountability for decisions and results into their 
daily activities. One hundred leaders provided complete 
responses for a completion rate of 78 percent, of which 71 
percent had worked at the organization for more than a dec-
ade. Two-thirds were based in Europe and the remainder in 
North America.
Measure
Each respondent reported on the accountability behaviors 
of their particular leadership team. The eight items from 
the piloted questionnaire were slightly modified to suit the 
organizational context (i.e., ‘I am part of a leadership team 
that … is accountable as a team for our performance’). 
Response options ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree. Coefficient alpha (α) of the measure is 
0.86 in this sample.
Results
We conducted EFA with principal axis factoring. Results 
of the scree plot and eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule indi-
cate that the measure is unidimensional, which matches the 
theoretical factor structure. The item with the highest load-
ing is ‘I am part of a leadership team that is accountable for 
our performance’ which is appropriate for the rationale for 
the TAQ. All item loadings exceed 0.60 per Table 2. These 
exploratory results provide support for the internal validity 
of the TAQ in an applied setting with senior professionals.
Study 1c: Scale Validation
The purpose of Study 1c was to use confirmatory factor 
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validity of the TAQ. 217 participants were recruited from 
an online commercial survey pool (Mechanical Turk) and 
received $1.00 in compensation for completing our question-
naire. The average age in the sample is 39 years. Slightly 
more than half of the participants were female and 28 per-
cent consider themselves minority. Participants have been 
with their current employer for an average of eight years 
and with their primary team for an average of 16 months. 
Eight-eight percent indicated they interact daily or hourly 
with their team members.
Measures
Participants were asked to describe the purpose of their pri-
mary team, their role assignment, and how frequently they 
interacted with team members. After this reflection, team 
accountability was measured with the TAQ (α = 0.88), trust 
was measured with four items (Simons & Peterson, 2000), 
and team commitment was measured with five items (Kirk-
man and Rosen, 1999). We selected trust and commitment 
for comparison constructs because they are the most closely 
related to team accountability and we wanted to ensure the 
TAQ accounted for variance beyond these related constructs. 
All items were measured using a 7-point scale where 1 = dis-
agree strongly and 7 = agree strongly.
Analyses
A series of CFAs were conducted in MPlus. Consistent with 
previous scale development best practices (e.g., Chen et al., 
2005; Hinkin, 1998) we first conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis that placed all eight items of the TAQ on one factor. 
The CFA revealed a single-factor structure that provided an 
excellent fit for the data, χ2(15) = 20.77, n.s., comparative 
fit index (CFI) = 0.99, and standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR) = 0.02 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Per Table 3, 
all items of the TAQ exceed the 0.30 cut-off value (Hair 
et al., 2009) and significantly loaded onto a single factor. 
The TAQ items exhibit a mean inter-item correlation of 0.51. 
These results provide evidence of a single-factor structure 
for the TAQ, supporting the previous EFA results.
Discriminant Validity A two-factor model of team 
accountability and team trust (χ2(53) = 143.83, CFI = 0.93, 
SRMR = 0.05) fits the data much better than a single-fac-
tor model (Δ χ2(1) = 231.31, p < 0.001). Similarly a two-
factor model of team accountability and team commitment 
(χ2(64) = 163.06, CFI = 0.94, SRMR = 0.05) fits the data bet-
ter than a single-factor model (Δ χ2(1) = 176.198, p < 0.001).
Convergent Validity As part of our CFAs, we also explored 
the correlation between latent variables and found the 
latent variables to be related but not overly so (i.e., TAQ 
& Trust, r = 0.59, p < 0.001; TAQ & Commitment, r = 0.77, 
p < 0.001). Taken together, these results suggest that team 
accountability as measured by the TAQ is a unique con-
struct.
With a usable measure of team accountability in hand, 
we next tested our hypotheses regarding the emergence of 
accountability in teams and whether it predicts effort, perfor-
mance, viability, and positive attitudinal states. To do so, we 
followed student teams competing in a business simulation 
for a span of three months.
Study 2: Hypothesis Testing
Sixty-five teams of students at an Irish business school 
participated in this study. These teams were tasked with 
Table 2  Exploratory factor analysis of TAQ (Study 1b)
I am part of a leadership team that ...
Factor 
Loading
1 Is accountable as a team for our performance .80
2 Justifies or explains our performance relative to team 
goals
.73
3 Holds team members accountable for doing their 
individual work
.70
4 Takes responsibility as a group for our decisions .65
5 Often explains to team members why we do certain 
things
.73
6 Monitors our team performance against our objectives .65
7 Keeps members informed of our progress .74





Table 3  Confirmatory factor analysis of TAQ (Study 1c)
Factor loadings are standardized
Factor 
Loading
1 We are accountable to each other as a team for our 
performance
.79
2 We are required to justify or explain our performance 
relative to team goals
.61
3 We hold each other accountable for doing our indi-
vidual work
.80
4 We take responsibility as a group for our decisions .74
5 In meetings we often explain to each other why we do 
certain things
.49
6 We monitor our team performance against our 
 objectives
.63
7 We keep each other informed of our progress .65
8 We can count on team members to deliver what they 
promise
.74
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using a simulation platform to develop a virtual business 
and then to compete over several months with fellow 
teams for market share and profits (www. marke tplace- 
simul ation. com). Participants were randomly assigned 
to a team. Membership was further stratified by gender 
and nationality to ensure each team included a randomly 
assigned woman and international student. All teams had 
4 to 5 members except one team with only 3 members. 
These teams operated under identical formal accountabil-
ity structures, were given the same team task, started and 
worked together for the same amount of time, and had 
similar resources at their disposal. Naturally controlling 
for these contextual features was deemed more valuable in 
testing our hypotheses about collective accountability than 
the external validity gained by conducting our research 
in a professional setting, particularly when business stu-
dents have the requisite understanding to respond knowl-
edgeably to basic issues such as their own team dynamics 
(Bello et al., 2009). The average amount of time spent by 
the team on the stimulation platform was 68 hours (h)—
summed across team members—with additional time 
spent on preparation, report writing, weekly tutorials, 
team meetings, and presentations.
Of the 302 individuals working on these teams, we 
received responses from 268 individuals over the course 
of the study. However, only 253 individual responses were 
usable after removing participants due to incomplete data, 
missing consent forms, and/or failed attention checks. 
Most participants provided data at one or two waves rather 
than all three, reflecting in-person attendance trends in the 
module.
Design
Each team was required to provide a written weekly 
report on its progress and member roles and individual 
contributions. Further formal accountability processes 
include monitoring of performance via the simulation 
platform, weekly discussion with a faculty expert, and a 
video recorded final presentation to two faculty experts. 
Of note is that the accountability expectations, timelines, 
and evaluation criteria were the same for each team in the 
competition. This context should ensure that any variability 
in accountability that remains is primarily due to internal 
team dynamics as opposed to formal structural account-
ability mechanisms.
Three waves of data were collected. The lead author 
distributed hardcopy study materials at the beginning of a 
weekly tutorial and returned after the end of each session 
to collect completed questionnaires. Time 1 occurred dur-
ing the initial development of the team in February 2016. 
Time 2 occurred at the midpoint of the simulation in March 
2016. At that point, teams had completed significant work 
together and had also received substantial feedback on their 
team performance. Time 3 occurred in April 2016 near the 
conclusion of the simulation. At that stage, there was little 
teams could do to change their performance on the simula-
tion, but they were still collaborating on a presentation to a 
panel of experts. After the conclusion of the competition, 
team performance data were recorded from the simulation 
platform.
Measures
Previously used measures were used for data collection. 
Accountability was measured using the 8-item TAQ.1 Affec-
tive identification and collective efficacy were measured 
shortly after the start of the project. Intragroup trust and 
team commitment were measured at the start, midpoint, and 
end of the team performance cycle. The viability of each 
team was measured at the end of the project.
We used financial performance in the simulation to opera-
tionalize overall team performance. The simulation platform 
measured financial performance as net profit from current 
operations divided by the total shares issued. A positive and 
large number is optimal. The simulation ran over 8 financial 
quarters. At the end of the fourth quarter, halfway through 
the simulation, teams received their first financial scorecard 
for their new business enterprise. At this time, the aver-
age was -0.8 across all 65 teams (min = -22.0, max = 89.0, 
SD = 15.7). Average team performance in the final quar-
ter of the stimulation was 62.5 (min = -14.9, max = 431.2, 
SD = 82.4). Due to skewness and kurtosis, the square root 
of the data is used in our analyses of financial performance. 
Several teams operated at a loss, so a constant was added to 
the original data to ensure the lowest value was equal to one 
prior to taking the square root.
Effort as a measure of team effectiveness was measured as 
the time the team invested in the task. The simulation plat-
form collected this data through the time each team member 
spent actively on the platform. We divided time spent on the 
platform by team size to account for the number of persons 
available to contribute to the task. During the fourth quar-
ter, the average team member was spending 12.0 h on the 
platform (min = 4.5 h, max = 22.5 h, SD = 4.0 h), and during 
the final quarter, the average team member was spending 
10.6 h on the platform (min = 1.8, max = 26.8, SD = 5.7). 
1 Following Chen and colleagues’ framework for validating team-
level constructs (2003) we conducted a team-level CFA on the TAQ 
using Time 3 data. The results indicate adequate support for the uni-
tary factor structure of the TAQ at the team level, χ2(19) = 31.05, 
p = .04; CFI = 93; SRMR = .08.
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A logarithmic transformation was implemented as the data 
were markedly positively skewed.
Analyses
SPSS was used to test our hypotheses. Analyses are reported 
at the level of the team unless noted otherwise. The rationale 
for this approach is that we are predicting team-level out-
comes from team-level inputs as that matches our theoretical 
viewpoint of team accountability. We recognize that there 
is room for debate over whether this is the most accurate 
way to represent accountability at the beginning of the team 
lifecycle as some teams may have crystalized collective 
perceptions more quickly than others; however, our meas-
urement and conceptualizations were at the team level so 
we report those analyses. Also, in the study environment 
teams received clear, uniform, and periodically reinforced 
formal accountability expectations which should have accel-
erated the sharedness of group accountability perceptions. 
In general, we found that relationships between constructs 
are stronger at the individual level than at the team level, so 
using team-level data yields more conservative estimates. 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics and Table 5 provides 
details on reliability and variance statistics for all self-report 
measures.
Because we believe collective accountability to be an 
emergent state, we first explored the stability of collective 
accountability across time (Marks et al., 2001; Waller et al., 
2016). To do this we retained the 46 teams for which we 
had data at all three collection points. Although there are 
significant differences in overall accountability perceptions 
between teams (β = 5.83, SE = 0.08, t = 74.95, p < 0.001), the 
descriptive statistics indicates that average accountability 
across the subsample of 46 teams with complete data does 
not vary much with time, i.e., Time 1 Mean = 5.83, Time 2 
Mean = 5.83 and Time 3 Mean = 5.88. An evaluation of the 
accountability within these 46 teams indicates that neither 
the linear nor quadratic polynomial growth rates are sig-
nificant in explaining team changes in accountability over 
time. Random coefficient modeling with time as a repeated 
measurement at Level 1 and team membership as a Level 2 
effect suggests that accountability does not appear to change 
much over time within teams. Bliese (1998, 2000) argues 
that the ICC(2) is useful for detecting emergent states. The 
ICC(2)s were 0.67 at Time 1, 0.82 at Time 2 and 0.85 at 
Time 3, exhibiting increasing consistency in evaluations 
over time. Taken together, these exploratory analyses sug-
gest that within a team accountability perceptions are rela-
tively stable.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 states that initial team accountability during 
team development should emerge hand in hand with team 
(a) trust, (b) affective identification, (c) commitment, and (d) 
collective efficacy. The data indicate a strong positive rela-
tionship between initial team accountability perceptions and 
trust (r = 0.67), commitment (r = 0.45), affective identification 
(r = 0.58), and collective efficacy (r = 0.55) during the initial 
stages of team collaboration. The first hypothesis is therefore 
supported. Formative team accountability perceptions are part 
and parcel of other positive emerging team attitudes.
Our next set of hypotheses examined the ability of ‘estab-
lished’ accountability at the project midpoint to predict sub-
sequent team outcomes. We assumed that end point values of 
the dependent variables are in part a function of their mid-
point values at time 2. For example, final performance is in 
some ways constrained by midpoint performance. Although 
including lagged dependent variables often decreases coeffi-
cient estimates for the independent variable of primary inter-
est and has been argued to unduly suppress the explanatory 
power of the independent variable, we included interim trust, 
commitment, performance, and effort as lagged dependent 
variables to provide a less biased test of the hypothesized 
relationship between accountability and subsequent team 
effectiveness and attitudes (Keele & Kelly, 2006). Lagged 
trust and commitment are highly correlated with another 
(r = 0.85), therefore we added them together in a single lin-
ear composite to reduce collinearity. Regression results are 
reported in Table 6.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict positive effects of team 
accountability on team performance and effort. Hypothesis 
2 does not receive strong support. Our data find that account-
ability is positively related to subsequent team performance, 
but is not a statistically significant predictor when added 
to a model that includes midpoint performance (β = 0.17, 
R2 = 0.41, ΔR2 = 0.01, n.s.). The strongest predictors of 
team performance are previous performance (β = 0.36) and 
effort (β = 0.43). In support of Hypothesis 3, we found team 
accountability is associated with a significant increase in 
team effort (β = 0.51, R2 = 0.29, ΔR2 = 0.12, p < 0.01).
The data support Hypothesis 4, that team accountabil-
ity is associated with greater viability (β = 0.38, R2 = 0.26, 
ΔR2 = 0.07, p < 0.05). Support for Hypothesis 5 is mixed. 
Accountability is positively associated with later trust 
(H5a) but this effect is not statistically significant (β = 0.21, 
R2 = 0.24, ΔR2 = 0.02, n.s.) when added to model with mid-
point trust and commitment. The strongest predictor of 
trust is previous trust and commitment (β = 0.39). Although 
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support is limited for Hypothesis 5a, Hypothesis 5b is sup-
ported: midpoint team accountability predicts subsequent 
team commitment (β = 0.36, R2 = 0.24, ΔR2 = 0.06, p < 0.05).2
Discussion
Our approach follows a relational understanding of accounta-
bility because we position team accountability as an emergent 
understanding of how things are done on a team that depends 
in large part on multiple evolving subjectivities rather than 
formal accountability structures. We agree with the view that 
a team is a ‘forum’ for moral tensions that often must be 
worked through by the members themselves (Sewell, 2012). 
Our data suggest that differences can emerge between teams 
even when they operate in a highly structured accountability 
environment, report to the same authority figures, share the 
same geographical location, work on identical tasks, and are 
comprised of members of similar experience.
Following a team over time allows us to develop a construct 
of team accountability that embraces the social processes 
through which ‘thick’ ethical norms are socially constituted 
(Islam & Greenwood, 2021). During the early life of a group, 
team accountability is closely related to trust, commitment to 
getting the job done, identifying as a team, and the belief that 
the team can accomplish what it sets out to do. This constel-
lation of positive attitudes persisted as the team evolved. It 
appears the lived experience of teamwork is of better qual-
ity when felt accountability is higher. Perhaps the strongest 
proof in the value of team accountability lies in members being 
keener to continue to collaborate after the end of the project.
Two results were unexpected. First, collective team 
accountability did not predict trust when we included 
lagged variables. Our inquiry was not intended to identify 
the strongest predictor of trust, but rather to test whether 
accountability measurably increased subsequent trust. 
One explanation for the lack of a relationships is statisti-
cal, namely that interim trust and accountability are highly 
correlated predictors and this makes it difficult for account-
ability to add predictive value in the hierarchical model. A 
more theoretical explanation is that once teams are up and 
running, trust is established and the strongest predictor of 
future trust is trust itself.
A second unanticipated result is that accountability did 
not meaningfully predict financial performance when pre-
vious performance and effort were included as predictors. 
Table 5  Variance and reliability statistics (Study 2)
Note: Grand mean is the average level of a construct within the teams. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) reports the proportion of 
variance in scale that lies between teams. Wald Z tests if there is signficant variation across teams. rwg(j) is an index of agreement within team 
members for j items on the multi-item measure. Out of range values were reset to zero. A uniform null distribution for item responses is a rectan-
gle (i.e., 1 and 7 equally likely to be chosen), but a slightly skewed distribution is more appropriate for scales such as these with a leniency bias











Z p < 
avg rwg(j)
uniform  > .70
avg rwg(j)
slight skew  > .70
Time 1
Team Accountability 0.72 5.70 0.03 0.44 0.06 0.95 0.35 0.92 98% 0.95 98%
Team Trust 0.81 6.00 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.17 0.87 0.90 94% 0.85 88%
Team Commitment 0.84 6.28 0.03 0.37 0.06 1.01 0.31 0.95 98% 0.93 96%
Team Identification 0.85 6.19 0.09 0.50 0.13 1.82 0.07 0.93 100% 0.90 90%
Collective Efficacy 0.81 6.22 0.04 0.31 0.10 1.50 0.13 0.97 98% 0.94 98%
Time 2
Team Accountability 0.80 5.64 0.16 0.37 0.23 2.58 0.01 0.91 93% 0.86 91%
Team Trust 0.87 6.01 0.15 0.71 0.15 1.83 0.07 0.89 91% 0.83 87%
Team Commitment 0.88 6.28 0.21 0.50 0.23 2.69 0.01 0.92 93% 0.87 89%
Time 3
Team Accountability 0.78 5.86 0.09 0.41 0.15 1.42 0.16 0.93 95% 0.89 93%
Team Viability 0.92 5.84 0.34 0.57 0.27 2.89 0.00 0.93 96% 0.88 89%
Team Trust 0.87 5.90 0.21 0.69 0.19 1.92 0.06 0.87 85% 0.78 80%
Team Commitment 0.90 6.17 0.18 0.59 0.19 2.03 0.04 0.90 91% 0.84 87%
2 Supplementary analyses without lagged dependent variables yields 
notably stronger effects. In particular, the regression coefficient for 
team accountability predicting final team performance (H2) increases 
from β = .17 to β = .25 and approaches traditional statistical signifi-
cance at p < .06. The regression coefficient for team accountability 
predicting team trust (H5a) increases from β = .21 to β = .39 and 
achieves statistical significance at p < .01.
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Fostering a sense of collective accountability is often 
intended as a managerial tool for driving organizational 
objectives and reducing loafing behaviors. In our study, team 
accountability exhibited stronger ties to emergent and affec-
tive team states than to subsequent performance. In other 
words, accountability expectations are not a performance 
panacea, although they do encourage greater time investment 
in shared goals and precede measurable improvements in 
some dimensions of concrete task performance.
It is possible our results were limited by the number of 
teams in our sample size or by using a single number to 
encapsulate performance, but our interpretation is that ulti-
mate performance is often somewhat outside the control of 
the team (de Leede et al., 1999). In the simulation for exam-
ple, financial performance depended in part on decisions of 
competitors and market conditions. Work analyzing the eth-
ics of teamwork have touched on this concern previously, for 
example highlighting violations of distributive justice where 
rewards are not in-line with collective efforts (Sewell, 2012).
Theoretical Contribution
Accountability is a sprawling theme that crosses discipli-
nary and methodological boundaries. The primary contribu-
tion of this study is to weave together philosophical ethics, 
management, and social psychology theories to explain the 
emergence, coherence, and consequences of teams devel-
oping a sense of accountability. By uniting a philosophical 
understanding of relational accountability (Painter-Morland, 
2006, 2007) with work on felt accountability (Hall et al., 
2017) and emergent team states (Waller et al., 2016) we 
offer a perspective on accountability that is firmly situated 
in team dynamics. Our work grounds high level concepts 
of relational accountability in specific instances of team 
identification, efficacy, commitment, viability, and trust. 
Using contemporary philosophical thought to analyze team 
accountability introduces powerful ideas about the moral 
obligations and being accountable ‘toward’ rather than ‘for’.
Detailed learning about team accountability matters 
because autonomous and empowered teams are increas-
ingly seen as the basic building block of agile organizations 
(Deloitte, 2020) and yet the existing accountability literature 
predominately views accountability as top-down compliance 
and formal mechanisms of control. A search of the Journal 
of Business Ethics in 2020 surfaced 183 abstracts for original 
research on accountability published since 1982. Over half 
of this work has been published in the past 10 years, sug-
gesting an increase in scholarly interest. However, only two 
of these articles specifically examined ethical issues related 
to the accountability of teams (de Leede et al., 1999; Joosten 
et al., 2014).
Two practical limitations to understanding the intricacies 
of team accountability are the lack of an appropriate meas-
urement instrument and the use of phantom or ephemeral 
teams (Hall et al., 2017; Kou & Stewart, 2018). Our work 
supports future cross-disciplinary research on collective 
Table 6  Regression analyses 
(Study 2)
The above regression coefficients are all standardized
***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, †p < .10
n = 58 teams (H2 and H3); n = 53 teams; (H4, H5a, and H5b)
Time 3
Performance Effort Viability Trust Commitment
(H2) (H3) (H4) (H5a) (H5b)
Model 1
 Dependent variables (Time 2)
 Performance .37*** .05 .02 -.17 -.05
 Effort .44*** .41** .25† .18 .06
 Trust + Commitment .11 .03 .33* .39** .41**
 R2 .40*** .18* .19* .22** .18*
Model 2
 Dependent variables (Time 2)
 Performance .36*** .04 .00 -.18 -.08
 Effort .43*** .37** .24† .17 .06
 Trust + Commitment -.01 -.34† .06 .25 .15
Independent variable (Time 2)
 Accountability .17 .51** .38* .21 .36*
R 2 .41*** .29** .26** .24** .24**
ΔR2 .01 .12** .07* .02 .06*
We Hold Ourselves Accountable: A Relational View of Team Accountability 
1 3
accountability by piloting and validating the TAQ. We 
demonstrate that this measure is reliable across three dis-
tinct work environments (the USA, Republic of Ireland, the 
United Kingdom), and use our findings to anchor account-
ability to the fundamental dynamics of a team. Another 
contribution to the study of accountability is to examine 
accountability in its natural environment, such as we did 
with the pharmaceutical leaders in Study 1b and the lon-
gitudinal study in Study 2. Most prior team accountability 
research has been conducted in experimental settings and 
few studies have utilized teams engaged in a task for real 
reward and punishment, and none to our knowledge have 
explored accountability over the life of the team.
Practical Implications
Our findings highlight that even within a highly structured 
accountability environment, accountability varies. Account-
ability policies and procedures are filtered through a sub-
jective lens so managers should not expect teams to react 
identically to the same policies and procedures. For example, 
formal accountability features are often open to misinter-
pretation despite frequent verbal and written cues (Patchan 
et al., 2018). Relationships among teammates are therefore 
critical to understanding team accountability.
Our findings also suggest that initial levels of group 
accountability persist, so managers should support initial 
team interactions because they may count ‘extra’ in form-
ing shared perceptions. If you seek a direct lever to improve 
team performance, look elsewhere, particularly when future 
performance is contingent on performance at previous lev-
els. Accountability appears to serve the team best by increas-
ing effort, viability, and deepening commitment.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study maps new territory and as such merits refinement 
and extension. We examine the relationship between rela-
tional accountability and team dynamics which is an essen-
tial step, but developing team accountability as a ‘thick’ 
rather than ‘thin’ ethical concept requires being descriptive 
and evaluative (Islam & Greenwood, 2021). Going forward, 
qualitative enquiries would be well suited to examining what 
might foster or derail team accountability. Future prescrip-
tive work could carefully examine the general assumption 
that perceived accountability is morally ‘good’ and that a 
team without shared accountability is ‘bad’. Our study sim-
plistically presumes more accountability is superior, but 
theoretical work is needed to identify when robust team 
accountability perceptions are procedurally unfair or can 
turn toxic to the welfare of the team, for example through 
stress responses, interpersonal conflict, and shunning or 
other punishment of norm violators. Such lines of inquiry 
could also examine when divergent perceptions of account-
ability are better for team outcomes than convergent percep-
tions, for example when a team is making sense of a failure 
to perform or processing decisions with ethical implications.
We also call for expanded outcome variables beyond the 
usual suspects. Based on research that connects workplace 
cultures of love and anger to employee loneliness (Ozcelik 
& Barsade, 2018), we believe future research should explore 
whether team accountability might have mental health ben-
efits including increased feelings of belonging and reduced 
loneliness at work, particularly in the age of virtual col-
laboration. The connection between relational accountability 
and these well-being related outcomes is a reminder that 
examining what is ‘good’ for members’ mental health is an 
important ethical dimension missing from most team out-
come variables. Techniques such as team interviews, obser-
vations, diary studies, and analyses of team artifacts would 
be particularly well suited to examining pivotal events and 
relationships that might foster or derail team accountability.
Future theory building could build bridges between 
shared team accountability and the formalistic or utilitarian 
ethical orientation of a team (Adler et al., 2021; Pearsall & 
Ellis, 2011), team ethical culture and climate (Cabana & 
Kaptein, 2019; Kim & Vandenberghe, 2020), and collec-
tive virtues such behavioral integrity (Palanski et al., 2011). 
Whether team accountability is a virtue or vice for a team 
likely depends upon what sort of team it is, and whether pos-
sessing this disposition makes it better or worse as that kind 
of group (Byerly & Byerly, 2016). Our work joins these in 
responding to the plea to situate the ethics of teamwork in 
the activities and multiple subjectivities of the team, rather 
than in abstract moral concepts (Sewell, 2007).
Unraveling the connection between leadership and collec-
tive accountability is also worth exploring. We utilized self-
managed teams in which leadership emerges organically. 
However, in organizations with hierarchical structures and 
leader/subordinate relationships, team accountability may 
arise as a substitute for strong team leadership, or strong 
leadership may be the driving force behind initial differences 
in team accountability perceptions. Furthermore, teams are 
likely to develop different types of accountability percep-
tions depending on the quality of their relationship with an 
external leader. For example, when mutual respect is absent 
or lost, a leader is more likely to lean on formal control 
mechanisms. In response, the team may limit accountability 
perceptions to the obligations specified. In contrast, when 
a team and leader form an emotional attachment and have 
positive mutual regard, accountability perceptions are more 
likely to be internalized (Erdogan et al., 2004). Regardless of 
formal accountability measures, in this situation perceived 
accountability should expand to encompass collaborative 
activities that contribute to mutual goals and well-being. 
A relational understanding of team accountability should 
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therefore explore leader-member exchanges and their forma-
tive role in perceptions of how work should be carried out 
by the team.
Accountability as a shared team characteristic has been 
explicitly incorporated into our theorizing and the subse-
quent measurement strategy is aligned with this conceptu-
alization, i.e., the TAQ is based on a referent shift model 
and many of our analyses use the team mean (Chan, 1998). 
This approach is consistent with how the majority of emer-
gent team states are conceptualized and operationalized 
(Waller et al., 2016), but future work could study relational 
team accountability through alternate models of emer-
gence (Chan, 1998; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). For exam-
ple, analyses of variation instead of convergence in team 
accountability perceptions could indicate active fault lines, 
healthy disagreement about the necessity of accountability 
processes, or insufficient team experiences to form the basis 
of shared perceptions. To further understand the relational 
nature of team accountability, researchers could examine 
developmental patterns of accountability perceptions across 
a team and the extent to which they reflect networks of trust, 
friendships, and moral obligations.
A strength of our research design is that we are able to 
examine accountability over the team’s lifespan in a highly 
controlled situation with fixed external accountability meas-
ures and leadership, identical performance challenges and 
timelines, objective measurement of performance and effort, 
and by teams of similar demography, size and experience. 
The effects of these factors would have been difficult to con-
trol for in a corporate setting, but the simulation and aca-
demic context we use cannot realistically mirror the inten-
sity of ‘real world’ accountabilities. Team accountability 
may well be reliably predictive of task performance when 
performance accompanies meaningful financial and profes-
sional implications or is measured along multiple dimen-
sions rather than reduced to a single metric as in this study. 
Future research should explore the connection between team 
accountability and performance in contexts with higher 
stakes.
Conclusion
This paper unites concepts from relational and felt account-
ability and team dynamics to provide an initial explanatory 
framework of team accountability and a measurement instru-
ment that can be used in practice and research to continue 
this work. If accountability is the glue that holds together 
organizations, and teams are the organizational unit of 
necessity and choice, then perceptions of team accountabil-
ity are worthy of intense attention across disciplines.
Appendix
See Table 7.
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